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Groups and information disclosure: Evidence on the 
Olson and Putnam Hypotheses in Japan 
 
 
Abstract. There is controversy between Putnam and Olson concerning the role of 
group. Putnam argued that small group makes a contribution to economic growth 
whereas Olson asserted that small group hampers the economic growth through 
rent-seeking behavior. Since the end of the 1990s in Japan, there has been a 
remarkable rise in the rate of enactment of public information-disclosure ordinances by 
local governments. This paper uses the panel data of Japan to compare the effects of 
Putnam-type horizontally structured groups and Olson-type vertically structured 
groups on government information disclosures. The Arellano-Bond type dynamic panel 
model is employed to control for unobserved fixed effects and endogeneity bias. The 
major findings are as follows: (1) the Putnam-type group has a positive influence on 
information disclosure; (2) the Olson-type group has a detrimental effect on information 
disclosure. These support not only Putnam hypothesis but also Olson Hypothesis. The 
characteristics of groups should be considered carefully when the influence of group is 
examined.  
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1. Introduction 
 
There are two conflicting views on the role of private associations in economic 
development. The classic work of Olson (1982) asserted that associations have a 
tendency to act as special interest groups that lobby for preferential policy at the 
expense of the rest of society. The typical organization represents a narrow segment of 
society and has little or no incentive to make any significant sacrifices for the interests 
of society as a whole. “The organizations are…therefore overwhelmingly oriented to 
struggle over the distribution of income and wealth rather than to the production of 
additional output.” (Olson 1982, p.44). Organizations that engage in rent seeking can be 
considered distributional coalitions. These organizations and associations lead to 
government failure and therefore hamper economic growth. In contrast to Olson’s 
assertion, Putnam (1993) shed light on the positive role played by associations. 
“Membership in horizontally ordered groups (like sports clubs, cooperatives, mutual aid 
societies, cultural associations, and voluntary unions) should be positively associated 
with good government.” (Putnam 1993, p.175). 1  Thus, associations make a 
contribution in preventing government failure, resulting in economic growth. 
The influence of groups seems to vary with each group’s goals and activities, which 
are different between Olson- and Putnam-type groups. Previous works concerning the 
Olson-Putnam controversy have focused mainly on the impact that types of groups have 
on trust and economic growth (Knack 2003; Pena Lopez & Sanchez Santos 2007)2. Few 
researchers have explored the relationship between Olson- or Putnam-type groups and 
government failure. Groups appear to influence the process of approving public policy, 
and so the aim of the public policy adopted is thought to depend on the degree of 
political power of the group. It is thus necessary to investigate the effects that groups 
exert on policy choice and institutional policy.  
Information asymmetry between citizens and government is considered one of the 
reasons politicians, bureaucrats, and special interest groups can seek their own benefits 
at the expense of other citizens. Assuming citizens can acquire sufficient information 
about the government relating to, for instance, the provision of public services or 
subsidies, citizens can criticize the corrupt behavior of politicians and bureaucrats, 
leading to increased benefits for the citizens. However, special interest groups are 
thought to hamper information disclosure since this would be detrimental to the vested 
                                                   
1 Putnam also argued that “membership rates in hierarchically ordered 
organizations…should be negatively associated with good government” (Putnam 1993, 
p.175), which is not incongruent with Olson’s view. 
2 Knack (2003) also examined the effect of group characteristics on economic growth.  
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interests of its members. In Japan, it has been observed that since the 1990s, an 
increasing number of local governments have come to enact public 
information-disclosure ordinances for the purpose of assuring fair governance, ensuring 
that government activity has become more transparent and enhancing citizens’ 
participation and local autonomy (Uga 2001). The enactment of information-disclosure 
ordinances seems to reduce the likelihood of government failure.  
This paper examines the effect of Olson- and Putnam-type groups on the enactment 
of public disclosure ordinances to investigate the Putnam and Olson hypotheses. Section 
2 briefly reviews the disclosure of local government information in Japan. Section 3 
explains the data and methods used. Section 4 discusses the results of the estimations. 
The final section offers concluding observations. 
 
2. Review of information disclosure and hypotheses 
2.1. Disclosure of local government’s public information ordinance 
In Japan, the central government enacted the information-disclosure law in 1999, 
which was about 30 years after the enactment of the Freedom of Information Act in the 
United States in 1967. Rather than the central government, local governments in Japan 
at the level of towns and villages have played a leading role in disclosing public 
information. In 1982, the town of Kanayama in northeastern Japan became the first to 
enact an information-disclosure ordinance (Muroi 1999). Information-disclosure 
ordinances signify the regulations of a particular local government providing residents 
the right to request the disclosure of information possessed by a local government. 
Figure 1 indicates that the rate of enactment of information-disclosure ordinances rose 
drastically from 1998 to 2004. The rate of enactment was about 0.2 in 1998 and reached 
0.9 in 20043 , 4 . The disclosure of the public information ordinances ensures local 
government accountability in towns, village, and municipalities. Information-disclosure 
ordinances are based on the right to know (Muroi, 1999).   
Information-disclosure ordinances enable citizens to identify fraudulent interests on 
the part of politicians, bureaucrats, or private firms. There are various kinds of corrupt 
                                                   
3 This rate becomes 1 if all local government enacted the ordinance. 
4 Since 2005, the annexation of municipalities, towns, and villages has rapidly 
increased. As a result, the number of municipalities, towns, and villages decreased to 
around 2,300 in 2005, and then to approximately 1,800 in 2009. Accordingly, the rate of 
municipalities enacting ordinances rose from 0.97 in 2005 to 0.99 in 2009. Annexation of 
municipalities is thought to be positively related to the rate of enacting ordinances. 
That is, the rate of enacting disclosure ordinances is partly affected by the annexation of 
municipalities. From 2005 to 2009, the change in the rate of enacting disclosure 
ordinances was minute. Therefore, I focus on the period of 1998–2004 in this paper. 
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uses of public funds, cheating, and collusion. Prior to the mid-1990s, 
information-disclosure systems were not well developed in most of Japan’s local 
governments. Bureaucrats often claimed expenses for business trips that were not 
actually undertaken, but this was not disclosed to citizens. In the early 1990s, 
politicians played essentially the roles of company managers, even though politicians 
were prohibited by law from engaging in side businesses. Firms managed substantially 
by politicians frequently received orders for construction work from local governments 
(Asano, 2010). It has been widely observed that subsidies were provided recklessly to 
sectors with strong electoral leverage, and local governments spent lavishly on public 
works projects. The fact that public funds were being illicitly used was revealed by 
means of information disclosure, and the total amount of such expenditure amounted to 
4 billion yen in 1998 (Muroi 1999, p.106). Once an information-disclosure system is in 
place, the process by which, for example, suppliers of public services are appointed can 
become transparent, and the inappropriate behavior of politician can be deterred. With 
such a system, citizens are able to scrutinize the possible collusion among politicians, 
bureaucrats, and private firms. As a result, in a number of prefectures, the practice of 
local bureaucrats using public funds to entertain central bureaucrats was in principle 
abolished (Matsui 2000, p.6). The details of bureaucrats’ business trips are now open to 
the public (Matsui 2000, p.6). Hence, information-disclosure ordinances have made a 
great contribution to improving the efficiency of local government5.  
As discussed above, public information-disclosure ordinances lead to the increased 
welfare of citizens. However, politicians, bureaucrats, and special interest group seem to 
lose the benefits of information asymmetry between local government and citizens. 
Hence, they are likely to oppose the disclosure of public information. In the process of 
enacting information-disclosure law, bureaucrats made an endeavor to emasculate the 
law (Tsuruoka & Asaoka 1997). 
 
2.2. Testable hypothesis 
Japanese society is historically rooted in a group responsibility system within a 
community. Putnam (1993) argued that groups characterized by a horizontal structure 
can be viewed as a source of generalized trust and lead to governmental efficiency. 
Public information-disclosure ordinances lead to an increase in the welfare of citizens 
and so to the mutual benefit of group members. “Groups that engage in little or no 
distributional lobbying…may tend to build trust and cooperative habits” (Knack 2003, 
                                                   
5 It has been found that the government’s public information disclosure is positively 
associated with GDP growth in Japan (Yamamura 2010b). 
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342). If this holds true, the members of such groups are likely to participate in collective 
action, resulting in an increase of benefits for the whole society. That is, horizontally 
structured groups lead to a positive externality on nonmembers. Compared with 
Olson-type groups, such as business associations, the gains from rent-seeking activity 
are less likely to exceed the cost for Putnam-type groups, such as sports clubs, mutual 
aid societies, cultural associations, and voluntary unions. Information disclosure may 
not reduce the benefits from information asymmetry between government and citizens 
for members of Putnam-type groups. The benefits of information disclosure are thus 
greater for members of Putnam-type groups than loss of information disclosure. These 
considerations lead to the advancement of Hypothesis 1: 
 
Hypothesis 1: Putnam-type groups enhance the disclosure of public information by 
governments.  
 
In Japan, it has been noted that lobbying activity by special interest groups results in 
governmental inefficiency and numerous budget deficits (Doi & Ihori 2002; Doi & Ihori 
2009, Ch.7)6. Local governments can acquire an amount of information that is distinctly 
greater than that available to the citizenry. Owing to such information asymmetry 
between governments and citizens, politicians and bureaucrats are likely to place 
higher priority on their own profits than on citizens’ welfare, which leads to various 
undesirable outcomes for society as a whole. Official information-disclosure ordinances 
enable citizens to collect information regarding governmental activity. Once citizens are 
able to access such information, they are more inclined to criticize policies that advance 
politicians’ and bureaucrats’ self-interest than before. As a result, budget allocations 
have become more efficient, which results in an increase in citizens’ welfare. On the 
other hand, special interest groups lose the vested interest for their members through 
rent-seeking activity. That is, thanks to the disclosure of public information by 
governments, benefits for the whole of society increase whereas the vested interests of 
special interest groups are reduced. Hence, special interest groups have a strong 
incentive to prevent public information-disclosure ordinances from being enacted. 
Members of the group take collective action against the ordinance. Thus, Hypothesis 2 
is proposed as follows: 
 
                                                   
6 “Agriculture-related public capital, fishing ports, flood-control measures, and forest 
conservation have been over-funded as a result of the lobbying activities of local-interest 
groups” (Doi & Ihori 2009, p.181). 
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Hypothesis 2: Olson-type groups impede the disclosure of public information by 
governments.  
 
3. Data and method 
 
3.1. Data  
Municipalities, towns, and villages are the lowest level of local government. From 
1998 to 2004, there were about 3,200 local governments in the municipalities, towns, 
and villages in Japan’s 47 prefectures7; the number of local governments is thus 
approximately 68 per prefecture.  
Proxy variable data for Olson-type groups were collected from the Establishment and 
Enterprise Census provided by the Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications 
Statistics Bureau. The Establishment and Enterprise Census contains data about 
various categories of organizations. In the present paper, proxy variables of Olson 
groups are (1) cooperative associations8 and (2) political and business organizations. 
This is because these organizations are established in part to act as special interest 
groups to lobby for preferential policies. The number of cooperative associations per 
population is denoted as OG1, and the number of political and business organizations 
per population as OG2. These groups are organized for special interest purposes. OG1 
and OG2 are incorporated to examine the effects of Olson-type groups on government 
information disclosure.  
Community fire-fighting teams originated in the Edo period (1600–1867), and they 
have continued to the present (Goto 2001). Community fire-fighting teams, which are 
informal institutions, are still required today in part because of the relative scarcity of 
fire stations, which are formal institutions. Such teams play an important role not only 
in combating fires but also in generating social capital through interpersonal 
communication in a cooperative protective activity against disasters in general (Goto 
2001). Members of such teams regularly patrol within their community to ensure that 
precautions are taken against fires and other disasters. Community fire-fighting teams 
clearly make a contribution to reducing the damage caused by natural disasters in 
Japan (Yamamura 2010 a). The structure of community fire-fighting teams can be 
regarded as horizontal, bringing together members of equivalent status and power. 
                                                   
7 A Japanese prefecture is roughly the administrative equivalent of an American state 
or Canadian province. 
8 In the Establishment and Enterprise Census, cooperative associations include (a) 
agriculture, forestry, and fishing cooperative associations and (b) business cooperative 
associations. 
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Thus, the number of fire-fighting teams per population is used as the proxy variable of 
Putnam-type groups, represented by PG. The numbers of fire-fighting teams is derived 
from Index Publishing (2006). GDP per capita and number of immigrants comes from 
the Asahi Shimbun (2008). 
The unemployment rate was obtained from the Web site of the Ministry of Internal 
Affairs and Communications Statistics Bureau. The population census (1990, 2000), as 
published by the Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications, provided data about 
the numbers of people who graduated from universities over the past 10 years; for the 
period 1990–2000, the data for 1998 to 2000 were generated by interpolations based on 
the assumption of constantly changing rates between 1990 and 2000. The data between 
2001 and 2004 were calculated by adding the annual number of people who graduated 
from university between 2001 and 2004. The annual data between 2001 and 2004 were 
collected from the Basic Report for Schools (2001–2004) published by the Ministry of 
Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology. The number of people who 
graduated from university and population data were used to calculate the rate of people 
who graduated from university. Definition and basic statistics of variables used in this 
paper are presented in Table 1. 
Table 2 reveals that PG is positively related to OG1 and OG2. I interpret this as 
suggesting that Olson-type groups are more likely to exist in places where Putnam-type 
groups exist. It follows from this that the determinants of forming groups are similar 
regardless of features of the groups. Furthermore, MOBIL(number of migrants from 
other prefectures per population) is negatively associated with OG1, OG2, and PG, 
which implies that both Olson-type and Putnam-type groups are less likely to exist in 
places where population mobility is more conspicuous. Groups enhancing collective 
action can form more easily when the social network is tighter. 
 
3.2. Methods 
 
To examine the hypotheses raised previously, this paper uses the Arellano-Bond type 
dynamic panel model (Arellano 2003). The estimated function takes the following form: 
DINF it=1 DINF i(t-1) + 2OG1it + 3OG2 it + 4PGit +５MOBILit +6UNEMPit + 
7GDPit+7EDUit+ui+εit,                                                                                        
 
where the dependent variable is DINFit in prefecture i, for year t. ’s represent the 
regression parameters. The lag of dependent variable is included as an independent 
variable. ui represents the unobservable fixed effects of prefecture i. The effect of ui is 
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controlled for by the dynamic panel model. εit represents the error term. The structure 
of the data covers 6 years for 47 prefectures. However, the dynamic panel model takes 
the first difference, and DINF it lagged two periods or more are used as instruments, 
which led to 47 observations for two years being discarded. Year dummies are included 
to capture macroeconomic factors. 
The effects of key variables in examining Hypotheses 1 and 2 are as follows: 
Hypothesis 1 creates the expectation that the coefficient sign of PG will be positive. In 
contrast, Hypothesis 2 anticipates that the coefficient signs of OG1 and OG2 will be 
negative. Putnam defined social capital as “features of social organization, such as trust, 
norms and networks that can improve the efficiency of society by facilitating 
coordinated action” (Putnam 1993, p.167). According to Putnam (2000), frequent movers 
have weaker ties within the community, and so mobile communities seem to have less 
interactivity with their neighbors than do more stable ones. Put differently, the more 
mobile a community is, the weaker its internal network becomes. Hence, MOBIL, 
denoting the number of migrants from other prefecture, can be considered a proxy for 
the decay of social capital. Social network, one of the features of social capital, appears 
to enhance collective action within a community (Putnam 1993, 2000). Hence, MOBIL 
can be considered to be negatively related to the formation not only of Putnam-type but 
also Olson-type groups. This presumption can be supported by the negative correlation 
between MOBIL and OG1 (OG2 or PG) exhibited in Table 2. Once the effect of these 
groups is controlled for by incorporating OG1, OG2, and PG, MOBIL can be considered 
to capture the other effects of population mobility. In more mobile societies, the 
long-term benefits from the residential place diminish because residents are more likely 
to move to other locations. Therefore, residents in more mobile societies are less likely to 
improve the conditions in their places of residence. This reduces the incentive to require 
enactment of public information disclosure by local governments even if such disclosure 
would improve the residential situation. MOBIL is thus predicted to be negative.  
Control variables such as UNEMP, GDP, and HC are incorporated to capture the 
economic condition. Unemployed people appear to be discontent with the performance of 
local governments because their unemployment is partly caused by the ineffectiveness 
of such governments. Hence, UNEMP is likely to require information disclosure and so 
is positive. Highly educated people can interpret the government’s information more 
effectively and so can make use of the information to improve the government, resulting 
in an increase in welfare. Therefore, highly educated people are more inclined to require 
information disclosure. The sign of EDU(rate of university graduation) is anticipated to 
be positive. 
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3.3. Endogeneity bias 
 GDP and unemployment rate seem to affect the decision making of local 
governments about the enactment of information disclosure. Conversely, there is the 
possibility of reverse causality, whereby the enactment of information disclosure 
influences the GDP and unemployment rate. Government public information disclosure 
is believed to make the government allocate resources more efficiently, thereby 
increasing GDP and reducing the unemployment rate9. In addition, people will tend to 
move to a place where they can earn a higher income. Information disclosure possibly 
affects the income level and therefore has an influence on MOBIL. If this holds true, the 
causality between enactment of information disclosure and GDP (UNEMP or MOBIL) 
should be considered ambiguous. Hence, the estimation results appear to suffer from 
endogeneity bias. GDP, UNEMP, and MOBIL are treated as endogenous variables in the 
dynamic panel model for the purpose of controlling for the estimation bias10. I use the 
level of endogenous variable lagged two periods or more as additional instrumental 
variables (Arellano 2003, p.168). 
 
4. Results 
 
The results of the dynamic panel model are shown in Tables 3, 4 and 5. All 
estimations control for the exogenous macrolevel shock by including year dummies as 
independent variables. As presented in Table 2, the correlation coefficient between OG1 
and OG2 is 0.66, suggesting a multicollinearity between OG1 and OG2. With the aim of 
alleviating the effect of multicollinearity, in addition to the full model including OG1 
and OG2, I also present alternative specifications that do not simultaneously include 
OG1 and OG2. In column 1 of Tables 3 and 4, and columns 1 and 4 of Table 5, the results 
of the full model are reported. In the remaining columns of Tables 3, 4, and 5, the 
results of alternative specifications are presented. The results of baseline estimates, 
which treat all independent variables as exogenous, are exhibited in Table 3. The 
results of estimations that treat MOBIL, UNEMP, and GDP as endogenous are shown 
in Table 4. Table 5 presents the results of estimates that treat all independent variables 
as endogenous.  
Tables 3, 4, and 5 provide the results of Sargan’s over-identification test and 
                                                   
9 By using OECD data, Alt & Lassen (2006) provided the evidence that fiscal 
transparency decreases debt accumulation. 
10 Baliamoune-Lutz (2009) used the dynamic panel model to alleviate endogenous bias 
by treating various independent variables as endogenous.  
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second-order serial correlation test (Arellano 2003). These tests are necessary to check 
the validity of the estimation results in the dynamic panel model. The null hypothesis of 
Sargan’s over-identification test is that the instrumental variables do not correlate with 
the residuals. If the hypothesis is not rejected, the instrumental variables are valid. 
Furthermore, the test for the null hypothesis (that there is no second-order serial 
correlation with disturbances in the first-difference equation) is important because the 
estimator is consistent when there is no second-order serial correlation. Tables 3, 4, and 
5 show that both hypotheses are not rejected in all estimations, suggesting that the 
estimation results are valid.  
In all columns of Table 3, the coefficients of OG1 and OG2 are, as anticipated, 
negative, while the coefficient of PG is positive. Also, OG2 and PG are statistically 
significant at the 1% level, OG1 is statistically significant at the 10% level in column 2. 
This is consistent with Hypotheses 1 and 2. Furthermore, the absolute values of the PG 
coefficient are approximately 10, which is about 8–10 times greater than those of OG1 
and OG2. That is, the Putnam effect is distinctly greater than the Olson effect. A 
significant negative value for MOBIL in all columns is in accordance with expectations. 
For control variables, GDP is positive, while being statistically significant in all 
columns. Other control variables are not statistically significant.  
The results presented in Table 4 are consistent with Hypotheses 1 and 2: the 
coefficients of OG1 and OG2 are negative, whereas that of PG is positive in all columns. 
In particular, OG2 and PG continue to be statistically significant at the 1% level. The 
absolute values of the PG coefficient are from 6.86 to 8.53, which are smaller than those 
in Table 3. Conversely, both absolute values of OG1 and OG2 are greater than those in 
Table 3. Hence, the difference in effect of Putnam’s and Olson’s groups becomes smaller 
after controlling for endogeneity bias in economic variables. MOBIL continues to be 
negative and statistically significant. The results of control variables are not stable, and 
so their effects are ambiguous. The results of alternative specifications presented in 
Table 5 are similar to those in Table4, suggesting that the results of estimations are 
robust. 
The combined results of Tables 3, 4, and 5 strongly support Hypotheses 1 and 2, 
which implies that both Putnam- and Olson-group effects on enacting public 
information disclosure are observable at the same time.  
 
5. Conclusion 
 
Olson (1982) argued that a social group is apt to lobby for preferential policy for its 
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members at the expense of the rest of society. This in part causes failures on the part of 
government. In contrast, Putnam (1993) asserted that a horizontally structured group 
fosters institutional success, reducing the likelihood of government failure. The conflict 
between Putnam’s and Olson’s ideas has not been sufficiently examined. This paper 
aims to examine the effects of Putnam- and Olson-type groups on government quality by 
using the panel dataset of Japan. 
In Japan, since the end of 1990s, local governments have actively enhanced 
information disclosure. Hence, there has been a remarkable rise in the rate of 
enactment of information-disclosure ordinances by local governments: various closed 
information areas can be accessed by citizens if they request them to be opened. When 
information-disclosure ordinances are enacted, special interest groups lobby for 
preferential policy and engage in rent seeking. This is because citizens are likely to 
criticize the government when it favors the special interest group at the expense of 
other citizens’ benefits. Hence, the Olson-type group has an incentive to prevent such 
ordinances from being enacted. On the other hand, the Putnam-type group is thought to 
prefer information disclosure because this makes a contribution to improving 
government transparency, leading to benefits to the whole of society. In enacting 
information-disclosure ordinances, both Olson- and Putnam-type groups are thus 
anticipated to play a critical role. Investigating these groups’ effects on ordinance 
enactment is thought to be an appropriate empirical case study for exploring the Olson 
and Putnam hypotheses. 
I used the Arellano-Bond type dynamic panel model to control for unobserved fixed 
effects and endogeneity bias. The major findings are summarized as follows: (1) the 
Putnam-type group has a positive influence on information disclosure; (2) the 
Olson-type group has a detrimental effect on information disclosure.  
Compared with the existing literature examining the effects of Putnam- and 
Olson-type groups on trust and growth (Knack 2003; Pena Lopez & Sanchez Santos 
2007), the primary contribution of this paper is twofold. First, the present study 
provides a definite understanding of the effect of groups on the choice of public policy. 
Second, it elucidates the opposite effects of Putnam- and Olson-type groups on policy 
choice. This paper, however, did not compare the influences between Putnam- and 
Olson-type groups regarding various political and economic issues, such as public 
spending, deficits, and government size, nor does it present a theoretical framework on 
which to base results. These issues should be researched to explore the questions of how 
and to what extent Putnam- and Olson-type groups have a different role in public 
economic issues. Finally, the sample size was small in this study, and larger samples are 
12 
 
recommended in future. 
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Fig.1 Rates of enactment by municipalities of government information-disclosure 
ordinances. 
Note: The rate becomes 1 if all local government enacted the ordinance. 
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Table 1. Variable definitions and basic statistics 
Variable Definition Mean Standard 
deviation 
DINF 
 
Rates of municipalities enacting government 
information-disclosure ordinances 
(municipalities enacting ordinances/all municipalities) 
0.63 0.32 
OG1  
 
Number of cooperative associations per population  
(number of cooperative associations/1,000 persons) 
0.31 0.13 
OG2  
 
Number of political and business organizations per 
population. 
(number of political and business organizations /1,000 
persons) 
0.35 0.11 
PG 
 
Numbers of fire-fighting teams per population 
(number of fire-fighting teams /1,000 persons) 
0.31 0.14 
MOBIL 
 
Number of migrants from other prefectures per 
population 
(number of migrants from other prefectures /1,000 
persons) 
19.5 4.85 
UNEMP  
 
Unemployment rate (%) 4.46 1.10 
GDP  
 
GDP (in millions of yen) 3.57 0.74 
EDU 
 
Rate of university graduation 0.09 0.03 
1 Data were collected from the Asahi Shimbun newspaper (2008) and the Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications Statistics 
Bureau (various years). 
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Table 2. Correlation matrix of variables used for estimation 
 DISCINF 
 
OG1 OG2 PG MOBIL UNEMP GDP HC 
DINFt-1 
 
1.00        
OG1 t 
 
-0.21 1.00       
OG2 t 
 
-0.06 0.66 1.00      
PGt 
 
-0.10 0.67 0.38 1.00     
MOBILt 
 
-0.05 -0.48 -0.23 -0.47 1.00    
UNEMP t 
 
0.09 -0.47 -0.07 -0.28 0.18 1.00   
GDP t 
 
0.21 -0.28 0.0003 0.43 0.36 -0.11 1.00  
HC t 
 
0.25 -0.62 -0.44 -0.62 0.73 0.18 0.53 1.00 
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Table 3. Dynamic panel model with DISCINFt,as dependent variable  
 (1) 
 
(2) 
 
(3) 
 
DINFt-1 
 
0.67*** 
(9.28) 
0.71*** 
(10.8) 
0.66*** 
(9.02) 
OG1 t 
 
-0.84 
(-1.62) 
-0.97* 
(-1.87) 
 
OG2 t 
 
-1.23*** 
(-2.67) 
 -1.62*** 
(-3.37) 
PGt 
 
10.4*** 
(4.04) 
8.79*** 
(3.39) 
10.8*** 
(4.14) 
MOBILt 
 
-0.05*** 
(-3.39) 
-0.04*** 
(-3.06) 
-0.04*** 
(-3.30) 
UNEMP t 
 
-0.03 
(-1.09) 
-0.02 
(-0.91) 
-0.02 
(-1.04) 
GDP t 
 
20.7** 
(2.01) 
21.1** 
(2.03) 
20.4** 
(1.94) 
HC t 
 
-1.59 
(-0.85) 
-1.26 
(-0.67) 
-1.68 
(-0.94) 
Constant 
 
-1.56* 
(-1.75) 
-1.52 
(-1.56) 
-1.82** 
(-2.16) 
Year dummy Yes Yes Yes 
Sargan test 
 <P-value> 
18.2 
<0.19> 
19.0 
<0.16> 
18.6 
<0.17> 
Serial correlation 
 Second-order 
<P-value> 
-0.55 
<0.57> 
-0.55 
<0.57> 
-0.50 
<0.61> 
Observations 232 232 233 
1 Numbers in parentheses are z-statistics.  
2 “Yes” signifies that year dummies are included as independent variables. 
*, **, and *** indicate significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.  
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Table 4. Dynamic panel model with endogenous variables and DISCINFt, as dependent 
variable  
 (1) 
 
(2) 
 
(3) 
 
DINFt-1 
 
0.59*** 
(20.3) 
0.61*** 
(20.6) 
0.61*** 
(26.2) 
OG1 t 
 
-1.00* 
(-1.74) 
-1.41** 
(-2.41) 
 
OG2 t 
 
-3.34*** 
(-2.76) 
 -3.86*** 
(-4.04) 
PGt 
 
8.53*** 
(4.61) 
7.72*** 
(4.83) 
6.86*** 
(4.60) 
MOBILt 
 
-0.05*** 
(-7.02) 
-0.05*** 
(-7.04) 
-0.04*** 
(-6.70) 
UNEMP t 
 
0.01 
(0.99) 
0.02 
(1.42) 
0.03* 
(2.15) 
GDP t 
 
-0.85 
(-0.13) 
11.3* 
(1.68) 
-5.19 
(-0.95) 
HC t 
 
2.07 
(1.15) 
3.77* 
(1.96) 
0.96 
(0.83) 
Constant 
 
0.17 
(0.17) 
-1.46* 
(-1.80) 
0.63 
(0.93) 
Year dummy Yes Yes Yes 
Endogenous 
variables 
MOBIL 
UNEMP 
GDP 
MOBIL 
UNEMP 
GDP 
MOBIL 
UNEMP 
GDP 
Sargan test 
 <P-value> 
33.9 
<0.99> 
37.1 
<0.97> 
34.0 
<0.99> 
Serial 
correlation 
 
Second-order 
<P-value> 
-0.75 
<0.45> 
-0.93 
<0.34> 
-0.65 
<0.51> 
Observations 232 232 232 
1 Numbers in parentheses are z-statistics.  
2 “Yes” signifies that year dummies are included as independent variables. 
*, **, and *** indicate significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.  
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Table 5. Dynamic panel model with endogenous variables and DISCINFt, as dependent 
variable 
 (1) 
 
(2) 
 
(3) 
 
(4) 
 
(5) 
 
(6) 
 
DINFt-1 
 
0.61*** 
(18.7) 
0.65*** 
(18.3) 
0.64*** 
(24.3) 
0.54*** 
(15.6) 
0.53*** 
(22.4) 
0.50*** 
(14.4) 
OG1 t 
 
-1.00* 
(-1.97) 
-1.56*** 
(-3.37) 
 -0.09 
(-0.22) 
-1.06*** 
(-2.66) 
 
OG2 t 
 
-2.08 
(-1.49) 
 -4.46*** 
(-4.03) 
-3.46*** 
(-3.15) 
 -4.78*** 
(-3.83) 
PGt 
 
12.2*** 
(4.66) 
13.4*** 
(4.91) 
15.2*** 
(7.11) 
10.2*** 
(5.74) 
10.9*** 
(4.38) 
13.2*** 
(5.99) 
MOBILt 
 
-0.04*** 
(-3.89) 
-0.04*** 
(-4.76) 
-0.05*** 
(-5.65) 
-0.03*** 
(-3.70) 
-0.03*** 
(-5.44) 
-0.04*** 
(-4.90) 
UNEMP t 
 
-0.01 
(-0.65) 
-0.01 
(-1.37) 
-0.01 
(-1.06) 
0.02 
(1.60) 
0.04*** 
(3.04) 
0.02 
(1.63) 
GDP t 
 
14.3 
(1.30) 
34.0*** 
(4.04) 
1.56 
(1.06) 
19.1* 
(2.06) 
31.2*** 
(3.31) 
11.9* 
(2.12) 
HC t 
 
-0.43 
(-0.39) 
0.28 
(0.23) 
-0.93 
(-0.83) 
-3.73* 
(-1.67) 
1.28 
(0.61) 
-2.18 
(-1.18) 
Constant 
 
-1.73* 
(-1.69) 
-3.52*** 
(-3.98) 
-1.42 
(-1.28) 
-1.24 
(-1.42) 
-3.39*** 
(-3.57) 
-1.29 
(-1.64) 
Year dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Endogenous 
variables 
OG1 
OG2 
PG 
MOBIL 
 
OG1 
PG 
MOBIL 
 
OG2 
PG 
MOBIL 
 
OG1 
OG2 
PG 
MOBIL 
UNEMP 
GDP 
HC 
OG1 
PG 
MOBIL 
UNEMP 
GDP 
HC 
OG2 
PG 
MOBIL 
UNEMP 
GDP 
HC 
Sargan test 
 <P-value> 
27.5 
<0.99> 
29.9 
<0.99> 
27.2 
<0.99> 
35.8 
<1.00> 
34.5 
<1.00> 
32.5 
<1.00> 
Serial 
correlation 
 
Second-order 
<P-value> 
-0.74 
<0.45> 
-0.74 
<0.45> 
-0.48 
<0.62> 
-0.61 
<0.53> 
-1.18 
<0.23> 
-0.77 
<0.43> 
Observations 232 232 232 232 232 232 
1 Numbers in parentheses are z-statistics.  
2 “Yes” signifies that year dummies are included as independent variables. 
*, **, and *** indicate significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.  
 
 
